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Small Debts, Big Burdens 
Chrystin Ondersma† 
 
“Small debts are like small shot; they are rattling on every side, and 
can scarcely be escaped without a wound . . . .”  
  – Samuel Johnson1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For the impoverished, even relatively small amounts of debt 
can be crippling.2 Individuals and families may be unable to 
meet their basic needs as a result of servicing this debt. Without 
savings, families must turn to credit to meet emergency ex-
penses or to cover gaps in income, and such debt can quickly spi-
ral. For example, a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study 
of vehicle title loans found that the median loan size was a little 
under $700—but, with the average annual percentage rate 
(APR) around 300%, many of the debtors were forced to take ad-
ditional loans to repay the balance, with most taking out four or 
more loans.3 For someone living on $1000 a month or less, a $700 
debt can quickly spiral out of control. In addition to the financial 
 
†  Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. I thank Abbye Atkinson, Drew 
Dawson, Pamela Foohey, Melissa Jacoby, Ted Janger, Dalié Jiménez, Robert 
Lawless, Nathalie Martin, Gina Tron, Jay Westbrook, the National Conference 
of Bankruptcy Judges, and the Shuchman Fund of Rutgers Law School for fi-
nancial support for data analysis, and my tremendous research assistants, 
Reema Chandnani and Deepta Janardhan. Copyright © 2019 by Chrystin 
Ondersma. 
 1. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 208 (Roger Ingpen ed., 
1909) (1791). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Debt, Poverty, and Personal “Financial Dis-
tress,” 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 493, 501 (2015). 
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burden of these debts, indebted individuals face the psychologi-
cal toll of creditors’ persistent collection efforts.4 
In some cases, individuals are even jailed or threatened with 
jail time after bouncing a check or failing to appear at a court 
proceeding related to a debt—even when the debt is disputed or 
they did not know about the lawsuit.5 For example, a disabled 
woman in Texas—whose only income was disability benefits—
was arrested for failure to appear in a case involving a $1500 
loan for truck driving school that had ballooned to $13,000 over 
the years with income and fees.6 Three U.S. marshals came to 
her home while she was asleep, and after she dressed and put on 
her prosthetic leg they shackled her feet and waist.7 In another 
case, an elderly man in Pennsylvania was threatened with arrest 
after a $10 check that his granddaughter had written bounced 
due to insufficient funds resulting from an unexpected nursing 
home charge.8 In a California case, an elderly woman with med-
ical problems was threatened with jail if she did not pay charges 
stemming from a $11.13 bounced check to a grocery store.9 She 
was told she owed $262.95, including $125 for a “financial ac-
countability class.”10 
While even small debts can be particularly burdensome for 
poor individuals and families, these debtors are the least likely 
to have access to debt relief.11 If regulators will permit loans that 
require all of a person’s disposable income to be diverted to ser-
vice the debt, there must be a way to escape this debt. For some, 
severe hardship may be ameliorated if debt can be swiftly tar-
geted and eliminated early on, enabling them to return to 
productivity and hopefully build at least a small safety net for 
the next emergency. 
It is unjust and nonsensical to require impoverished debtors 
to undergo an expensive and burdensome process to obtain re-
lief. This proposal is not about expanding entitlements to bank-
 
 4. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bank-
ruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 315–16 (2010). 
 5. ACLU, A POUND OF FLESH: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE DEBT 4 
(2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/022318 
-debtreport_0.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 47. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 57. 
 9. Id. at 58. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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ruptcy relief. Instead, this proposal is designed to make bank-
ruptcy relief that is currently legally available, actually availa-
ble to a subset of a group that currently faces great barriers to 
access. Although improving access to debt relief for all poor debt-
ors is urgent, particularly those with the largest debt loads, I 
propose a fast-track debt relief process for debtors living at or 
below the poverty line and owing less than $5000 in debt. Such 
amounts are unlikely to harm creditors. Not only is the loss rel-
atively small, but many of these debts may also have been ulti-
mately uncollectable. While these debts can be crippling to the 
impoverished, relieving such debts is unlikely to cripple credi-
tors.  
This proposal is only a partial solution, however. First, 
credit will never be capable of solving chronic income shortfalls, 
and debt relief cannot solve them either.12 However, at present 
many impoverished individuals and families have no choice but 
to turn to credit, particularly when faced with unexpected ex-
penses or unexpected drops in income. Individuals are often 
forced to choose between servicing their debt and meeting their 
basic needs.13 It is crucial that speedy debt relief be available in 
order to prevent a debt spiral. My proposal is also only a partial 
solution because it only applies to debtors with relatively small 
amounts of debt—even though it is clearly essential that bank-
ruptcy relief also be accessible to impoverished individuals with 
great debt loads. However, I do not believe it is currently politi-
cally feasible to fast-track all bankruptcies based on income 
alone. This does not mean that things cannot be done to expand 
access for this population; indeed, if the proposed system func-
tions well perhaps a modified version of this system can be used 
for poor debtors with larger debt loads.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I first discusses the 
burdens of debt on the poor—even when debt loads are relatively 
small. Then this Part explores whether and in what circum-
stances poor debtors can benefit from bankruptcy, and finally re-
views the barriers to bankruptcy filing for poor debtors. Part II 
proposes a fast-track debt relief process for debtors whose in-
come is at or below the poverty line and who owe less than $5000 
 
 12. Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 65) (on file with author). 
 13. Cf. Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the 
Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 272 (2010) 
(“[F]inancially distressed families constantly make difficult choices about how 
to juggle expenses.”).  
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in debt. I argue that such a program would provide tremendous 
relief for debtors without over-burdening creditors. I then dis-
cuss precisely how such a system could be implemented using 
our existing bankruptcy system. Finally, Part III considers two 
types of objections. First, the objection that such a system should 
be administrative rather than part of the bankruptcy system. 
And second, the objection that the proposal will distort both 
lender and borrower behavior. 
I.  DEBT WITHOUT RELIEF   
A. THE HEAVY BURDEN OF SMALL DEBTS ON THE POOR 
Lower-income debtors have less debt than higher-income 
debtors, but that debt represents a much larger share of their 
income. The average credit card debt owed by someone who 
makes $21,432 per year is $3611 in credit card debt, or 17% of 
annual income.14 In addition, the average debt for individuals 
whose debt has gone to collection is relatively low. On average, 
individuals that have a debt in collections only owe around 
$1300.15 For non-medical debt, the median is $366, and for med-
ical debt, the median is $207.16 Only 2.8% of non-elderly individ-
uals experienced family medical expenses over $10,000, and only 
14% experienced medical expenses over $5000.17 However, 43% 
experienced medical debt in excess of $2000.18 An estimated 77 
million Americans—or 35% of adults—have at least one debt 
that has gone to collection.19 One in five individuals have medi-
cal bills in collection.20 
 
 14. Erin El Issa, 2016 American Household Credit Card Debt Study, NERD-
WALLET n.14, https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-debt/household 
-credit-card-debt-study-2016 (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (“We used consumer-re-
ported data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and revolving credit card 
balance data from Experian to estimate revolving debt based on household in-
come. We used the estimated average credit card APR of 18.76% from our inter-
nal data to calculate the amount of interest each household would pay. House-
holds that made less than $21,432 owed $3,611 in credit card debt and paid 
annual interest of $677 on credit cards. Households that made more than 
$157,479 owed $13,406 in credit card debt and paid annual interest of $2,515.”). 
Meanwhile, the average debt for earners around $150,000 is just over $10,000, 
but that represents just 7% of that household’s income. Id. 
 15. ACLU, supra note 5, at 9.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Melissa Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307, 
309–10 (2007). 
 18. Id. at 310. 
 19. ACLU, supra note 5, at 9.  
 20. Id.  
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Although these amounts are relatively small, for individuals 
living below the poverty line, small amounts of debt can cause 
severe hardship. When income is not sufficient or hardly suffi-
cient to meet basic needs, emergencies such as job loss, medical 
expenses, car repairs, or other sudden costs or sudden drops in 
income can cause individuals to become trapped in debt.21 One-
third of families have $0 in savings, and 41% of families report 
that they would be unable to come up with $2000 to cover an 
emergency expense.22 Seventeen percent of poor families spend 
more than 40% of their family income on health care, while only 
0.2% of families with incomes at or above 200% of the poverty 
line spend over 40% of their income on health care.23 When indi-
viduals have no savings and nowhere to cut, they have no choice 
but to turn to credit.24 However, when the loan comes due the 
individual still does not have excess disposable income, so they 
must cut on food, rent, or utilities in order to pay the bill. Mean-
while, interest accrues and it becomes less and less likely that 
the individual will ever be able to get out from under the debt.  
As Sara Greene explains in discussing her study of how low-
income debtors manage emergencies with debt, even when the 
“initial shock was relatively small, the resulting cycle of debt, 
interest, and fees became almost inescapable.”25 In some cases, 
as discussed above, individuals may go without food, electricity, 
or necessary medication in order to service debt.  
These burdens fall hardest on Black and Latinx individuals, 
who, as a result of persistent and systemic racist policies and 
practices, are more than twice as likely to be poor than white 
individuals.26 White households have thirteen times the median 
wealth of Black households and ten times the median wealth of 
Latinx households.27 Black and Latinx debtors are more likely to 
 
 21. Id. (“Many Americans spiral into indebtedness because they are living 
in a state of financial peril and are pushed over the edge by a traumatic event 
like the loss of a job, serious illness, or divorce, exacerbated by snowballing in-
terest rates and fees.”); see also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 
DUKE L.J. 233, 271–72 (2017) (including a sample of seventy-one low-income 
individuals in North Carolina). 
 22. ACLU, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
 23. Jacoby, supra note 17, at 310. 
 24. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 10 (“56[%] of Americans say their incomes 
are falling behind the cost of living.”). 
 25. Greene, supra note 21, at 291. 
 26. ACLU, supra note 5, at 10. 
 27. Id. (citing On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are 
Worlds Apart, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends/org/ 
2016/06/27/1-demographic-trends-and-economic-well-being/#fn-21776-11). 
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be “targeted for risky financial products, such as payday loans,”28 
and are less likely to have savings available to cover emergency 
expenses.29 Controlling for income, there are twice as many debt 
collection lawsuits in Black communities than in white commu-
nities.30 
My empirical work with undocumented debtors provides ad-
ditional evidence of the tremendous hardship that even small 
loan amounts impose on the poor. I spoke with fifty-three undoc-
umented individuals,31 and many of these individuals reported 
feeling that their debts were too much to handle even though the 
amounts borrowed were relatively small.32 Eighty-five percent of 
the individuals I interviewed carried debt, and the majority had 
borrowed from multiple lenders.33 Several borrowed from more 
than two sources.34 However, despite these hardships and mul-
tiple borrowing sources, only four individuals owed more than 
$5000.35 Four individuals owed between $2500 and $5000, five 
 
 28. Id. (citing FDIC, FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UN-
DERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 83–84 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/ 
2013appendix.pdf) . 
 29. See id. (explaining if “the bottom 25 percent of white households” liqui-
dated all financial assets, they would have $3000 on average, whereas a full 
quarter of “African-American families would have less than $5” after liquidating 
assets (citing What Resources Do Families Have for Financial Emergencies?, 
PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research 
-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/emergency-savings-what-resources-do 
-families-have-for-financial-emergencies)). 
 30. Id. at 11 (citing Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How 
Collection Suits Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black 
-neighborhoods).  
 31. I describe the study in detail in my earlier paper, Debt Without Relief. 
The design of the study was based on snowball sampling, a technique used to 
reach sensitive populations. Chrystin Ondersma, Debt Without Relief: An Em-
pirical Study of Undocumented Immigrants, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1801, 1808 
(2017). In a snowball sample, initial interviews are conducted with individuals 
based on a personal connection—in this case, a group of street vendors in New 
York City—and are then invited to have their family and friends participate in 
the study. Id. at 1809. The interview was conducted in two parts, and partici-
pants were paid fifty dollars for each part. Id. Interviews were conducted in 
Spanish, recorded, transcribed, and translated. Id. The interview questions in-
cluded demographic questions, questions about individuals’ financial situations, 
questions about individuals’ borrowing experiences, and questions about indi-
viduals’ potential consideration of bankruptcy relief. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1830. 
 33. Id. at 1815. 
 34. Id. at 1816. 
 35. Id. at 1818. 
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owed between $2000 and $2500, ten owed between $1000 and 
$2000, and the rest owed less than $1000.36 
Although the amounts of these debts are relatively low, 
nearly a third of debtors always or often felt that their debts 
were too much to handle.37 An additional 37% occasionally felt 
that their debts were too much to handle.38 Fourteen debtors ex-
pressly discussed feeling overwhelmed by creditor calls.39 As I 
report in my previous paper, study participants reported that 
creditors would call repeatedly: “[E]veryday 2–3 times a day,”40 
“when I am busy and at work,”41 just “calling and calling and 
calling,”42 or “just to bother you for no reason and they keep call-
ing you only to annoy you.”43 Others described creditors calling 
to collect even after they had agreed to a negotiated payment 
schedule: “The thing is they know the times that I’m supposed to 
pay, since we had an agreement. They still keep calling you, they 
harass but you already had an agreement.”44 Several study par-
ticipants described the anxiety caused by the repeated calls: 
“[W]hen they call repeatedly I get nervous, I feel like someone’s 
going to choke me,”45 and the repeated calling “stresses me out 
and put[s] me in a bad mood.”46 
Although some of the debt incurred may have been incurred 
due to chronic income shortfall, for many of these individuals, 
debt was incurred in the wake of severe hardship.47 Thirty-nine 
individuals (75%) had experienced an unexpected hardship such 
as job loss, divorce, death of spouse, eviction or foreclosure, hos-
pitalization, deportation proceedings, or arrest.48 Twenty-nine 
participants (over half of participants) experienced more than 
one of these hardships.49 This suggests that a substantial portion 
of the debt was incurred as a result of a sudden expense or sud-
den drop in income.  
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1830. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0001). 
 41. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0004). 
 42. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0009).  
 43. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0003).  
 44. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0012). 
 45. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0030). 
 46. See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0048). 
 47. Id. at 1811. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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These debt burdens can have extremely dire consequences. 
In addition to harassing creditor calls, threats of garnishment, 
repossession, and foreclosure, in many instances debtors are 
even threatened with arrest, and in fact jailed, in cases stem-
ming from small amounts of private debt.50 If a debtor does not 
appear in court to contest a debt, the court can issue a default 
judgment.51 Individuals may miss court dates because they were 
not served, were confused by the notice, were unable to leave 
work, unable to find childcare, or were unable to attend for med-
ical reasons.52 After the judgment is issued, the debtor may be 
summoned to appear in court to address the payment of the judg-
ment, and/or to fill out paperwork providing information about 
their financial assets.53 In forty-four states, courts are able to 
“issue warrants for the arrest of debtors who” do not comply.54 
Every year tens of thousands of arrest warrants are issued that 
stem from a failure to pay a private debt.55 The ACLU was able 
to obtain data on arrest warrants issued in debt collection pro-
ceedings from three states and four counties, and found that in 
these counties more than 8500 arrest warrants were issued in 
2016 pursuant to debt collection proceedings.56 In many of these 
cases the debts are small: the ACLU documented hundreds of 
cases where individuals were arrested for medical debts of less 
than $1000.57 Arrest warrants can result even when the 
amounts of debt at issue are miniscule—even amounts under 
$10.58 In twenty-four of the twenty-seven case studies the ACLU 
reported, the original debt at issue resulting in jail or threat of 
 
 50. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 27 (noting cases where threatening letters 
were sent for checks that bounced for as low as two dollars). 
 51. Id. at 22 (citing FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CON-




 52. Id. at 22. 
 53. Id. at 13. 
 54. Id. at 12. 
 55. Id. at 4.  
 56. See id. at 12 (stating this information was obtained by the ACLU 
through the Freedom of Information Act and open records requests).  
 57. See id. at 45 (noting the hundreds of cases in Maryland). 
 58. See id. at 7 (stating that the ACLU documented thousands of cases 
where consumers were threatened with jail for bounced checks under ten dol-
lars).  
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jail was less than $5000, and in at least ten of these cases the 
amount of the original debt was less than $1000.59  
Many of these cases are manifestly unjust. The cases men-
tioned in the introduction are just a few of numerous horrifying 
examples. Other examples include a single mother in Nebraska 
who was arrested in front of her children and jailed for failure to 
appear on a case stemming from a $176.50 medical bill,60 a man 
in Utah who committed suicide after being jailed for failing to 
appear on a case stemming from a $2000 ambulance ride 
charge,61 and a man in Indiana who was placed under arrest in 
front of his four young kids, then brought to jail where he spent 
two nights after being strip-searched—the case stemmed from a 
$4024.88 auto loan deficiency, where the car had already been 
repossessed and the man was not aware that he had been sued.62 
Some debtors who are unable to pay debts stemming from 
bad checks are also threatened with jail by virtue of agreements 
between prosecutor’s offices and collection agencies, whereby 
debt collection agencies are permitted to use the prosecutor’s 
seal on the demand letter.63 The individual is informed that fail-
ure to pay the debt—not just the initial debt, but a variety of fees 
imposed by the collection agency, which sometimes more than 
quadruple the initial charge—is a crime and that non-payment 
can result in jail.64 The fees include, for example, a $150–200 
charge to attend a mandatory financial responsibility class—pro-
vided, of course, by the debt collector itself.65 Again, the initial 
debt can be miniscule: one lawyer in Washington state docu-
mented over 10,000 cases where a check written for under $10 
resulted in letters threatening arrest and prosecution.66 In 
Washington, a mother of three received such a letter bearing the 
seal of the Kitsap County prosecutor’s office and informing her 
that she faced criminal charges if she did not pay $41.19 plus 
over $200 in fees, all stemming from a $41.19 check to Goodwill 
for the purchase of clothes for her children.67 An individual in 
 
 59. See generally id. at 45–46 (outlining the ACLU’s case studies). 
 60. Id. at 45. 
 61. Id. at 46. 
 62. Id. at 55. 
 63. Id. at 4.  
 64. Id. at 7; see also id. at 4–5 (discussing an initial $2500 student loan that 
mushroomed into $12,000 with interest and fees).  
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. See id. (citing Interview by ACLU with Paul Arons, Lawyer, Law Office 
of Paul Arons (Apr. 12, 2017)). 
 67. Id. at 27 (referencing Cavnar v. BounceBack, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-235 
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Los Angeles was threatened with criminal prosecution after 
bouncing a $3.87 check to Ralphs grocery store—she ultimately 
paid $444.87 to the debt collector, including $150 in diversion 
class fees and $225 in missed class fees.68 The elderly man in 
Pennsylvania who bounced a $10 check for medicine, and the el-
derly woman in California who bounced an $11.13 for groceries, 
were also sent letters threatening arrest and listing hundreds of 
dollars of charges because of this kickback arrangement.69 
Even where no arrest happens, threats of imprisonment 
may scare individuals to going without crucial basic needs, in-
cluding food and medication, in order to pay the debt—even 
when the debt is not actually owed.70 For example, one seventy-
five-year-old woman living on social security was frightened into 
paying the charges for fear of jail—but in order to pay the debt, 
she went without her medications.71 A woman in Georgia was 
frightened into paying a $800 debt her daughter allegedly owed; 
she borrowed money to make part of the payments, and stopped 
paying her utilities, resulting in her power being shut off.72 The 
ACLU reported that, in many of the cases they reviewed, “debt-
ors took out high-interest payday loans, borrowed from friends 
or relatives, surrendered public benefits, or went without food or 
medication to avoid the threat of jail.”73 In addition, although 
income from social security or disability is exempt from collec-
tion, threats from debt collectors can cause individuals to give 
up this income in order to satisfy debts.74 
The experience of being jailed and arrested can cause severe 
psychological trauma.75 Individuals arrested under contempt or-
ders stemming from debt reported a number of medical prob-
lems, including “anxiety, [insomnia,] stomach problems, panic 
attacks . . . inability to travel” or to remain home alone, and 
worsening of conditions such as Crohn’s disease.76 In a Maryland 
 
-RMP, 2015 WL 4429095 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 2015)). 
 68. Id. at 28.  
 69. Id. at 58 (referencing Smith v. Levine Leichtman Capital Partners, Inc., 
723 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). 
 70. Id. at 7.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 35 (referencing Gibson v. Rosenthal, Stein, & Assocs., No. 1:12 
-cv-2900-WSD, 2013 WL 8367255 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2013)). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 35–36.  
 75. See id. at 19 (noting instances of parents being arrested in front of their 
children and the corresponding emotional distress). 
 76. Id. at 20. 
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case, an elderly married couple (ages seventy-eight and eighty-
three) were each jailed for failing to appear in a case involving 
$2342.76 that they owed to their homeowner’s association.77 The 
couple was never even served.78 
While in jail, the husband “began vomiting blood and be-
came non-responsive,” and had to be transferred for emergency 
treatment.79 
If the debtor has young children, the trauma is magnified. 
In one Pennsylvania case, a mother was arrested while her mi-
nor son slept, and the police refused to allow her to wake him 
and explain what was happening.80 In another incident in Ohio, 
a woman was placed under arrest while home with her three-
week-old infant.81 In Georgia, a woman was arrested in front of 
her five-year-old after police were called during a family argu-
ment and found an outstanding warrant on a default judgment 
from unpaid rent—the woman had no idea that her landlord had 
sued because she had never been served.82 In Washington, an 
individual was arrested while at home with his six-year-old dis-
abled son—he was kept in the police car for over an hour, “watch-
ing in horror as his son sobbed and ran, scared and confused, in 
and out of their home.”83 All this because the father missed a 
hearing about the deficiency amount he owed on his pickup truck 
after it had been repossessed.84 
In some cases, individuals have been fired for missing work 
as a result of being jailed; for example, an Illinois truck driver 
was fired for missing six days of work while jailed, and an Indi-
ana woman was fired after being arrested while at work.85 Even 
if the debtor does not end up spending time in jail, the issuance 
of an arrest warrant alone may appear on a background check, 
putting in peril job, housing, and educational opportunities.86 
 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 19.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 24. 
 83. Id. at 19. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. at 6. 
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B. THE BENEFITS OF BANKRUPTCY FOR POOR INDIVIDUALS WITH 
RELATIVELY SMALL DEBT BURDENS 
There are clearly risks associated with even small amounts 
of debt. In an ideal world, it would not be necessary for poor in-
dividuals to turn to credit to meet their basic needs. As Abbye 
Atkinson points out in her forthcoming article, Rethinking 
Credit as Social Provision, credit is not an appropriate solution 
to poverty.87 She points out that credit can only be helpful if the 
future version of the debtor is likely to have a higher income—if 
not, credit cannot provide assistance, because the future self will 
never have additional income with which to repay the debt, and 
will be required to forego essentials if the debt is to be repaid.88 
Unfortunately, at present it does not seem likely that a more 
robust welfare system is imminently forthcoming. As I discuss 
in my article, A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief, I ar-
gue that if a government is unwilling to ensure access to basic 
needs (including housing, water, health care, and food), and 
debtors will thus be required to incur debt in order to cover their 
basic needs—particularly if an emergency arises—a robust and 
accessible debt relief system is crucial.89 
Of course, bankruptcy is not the only road to debt relief: fed-
eral and state legislatures could severely curtail debt collection 
if they so choose. Some have suggested radical solutions such as 
prohibiting courts’ involvement in any debt collection below a 
certain amount.90 Dalié Jiménez has suggested a complete ban 
on any collection activity after the statute of limitations has ex-
pired.91 A far more robust Fair Debt Collections Act and other 
state debt collection reforms could also ameliorate the burden of 
debt collection activity on impoverished debtors. Finally, at a 
minimum, arrest or threats of arrest could be severely curtailed 
or prohibited altogether; indeed, some states already wholly ban 
arrest related to the non-payment of debt.92 The ACLU Report 
 
 87. Atkinson, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief, 36 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 269, 338–39 (2014). 
 90. See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE 296 (1974). 
 91. Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 
78 (2015). 
 92. ACLU, supra note 5, at 6 (explaining that in forty-four states judges can 
issue arrest warrants for failure to appear at post-judgment proceedings); Note, 
State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1024, 1037–38 nn.116–20 (2016). 
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also includes a number of excellent proposals to prevent individ-
uals from being jailed or threatened with jail as a result of ina-
bility to pay private debts.93 Although each of these proposals 
would relieve the burden for low-income debtors, none offers a 
completely clean slate for over-indebted individuals. Many debt-
ors have debt from multiple sources, and could benefit from a 
solution that would resolve all of their debts at once and offer 
them a fresh start completely free of their debts. 
Can bankruptcy be part of this solution, even if the debt bur-
den is relatively small? There are not many existing filers with 
small amounts of debt: In 2007, the 25th percentile with respect 
to the amount of unsecured debt was $18,351, and the 25th per-
centile with respect to the amount of total debt was $38,425.94 
The median debt load was $87,261, and the median unsecured 
debt load was $33,882.95 In their 2010 study of chapter 7 bank-
ruptcies, Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne explain that 
debtors in the sample had a median income of $21,870 and a me-
dian unsecured debt load of $27,573.96 In an additional study by 
Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne in 2017, the median un-
secured debt in chapter 13 bankruptcies was $ 23,440.97 Data 
suggest that fewer than 2% of debtors currently in the bank-
ruptcy system owe $5000 or less.98 But you would not expect fil-
ers with debt burdens of $5000 or less to seek bankruptcy relief 
under the current system; the complexity and expense are dis-
proportionate to the relief. Naturally, debtors that do not file for 
bankruptcy have much lower debt loads—the median unsecured 
debt was $7000 in 2011.99 That does not mean, however, that all 
those with lower debt burdens are unburdened by their debt ob-
ligations. 
 
 93. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 7, 40–43. 
 94. John A. E. Pottow et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 404 (2008). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh 
Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 82 (2006). 
 97. Sara S. Greene et al., Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1049 (2017). 
 98. E-mail from Robert M. Lawless, Professor, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, to 
author (Oct. 23, 2018) (on file with author) (reporting Stata calculations based 
on data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project). In 2007, only 11 of 2384 debt-
ors in the 2007 sample owed less than $5000; in the current Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project, only 10 of 513 debtors owe less than $5000. Id. 
 99. MARINA VORNOVYTSKYY ET AL., CENSUS, HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN THE 
U.S.: 2000 TO 2011, at tbl.A1, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ 
library/working-papers/2011/demo/debt-highlights-2011.pdf. 
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Bankruptcy can indeed be extremely valuable even for debt-
ors with relatively low debt burdens. First, bankruptcy ceases 
creditor collection activities, including harassing creditor phone 
calls,100 repossession, foreclosure or eviction actions,101 and col-
lection law suits—including arrest warrants stemming from 
such cases.102 Second, bankruptcy allows debtors to keep the 
fruits of their labor going forward rather than requiring ever-
increasing portions of debtors’ funds to be diverted to creditors 
perpetually.103 
1. Ceasing Collection Actions 
Filing for bankruptcy would put an immediate end to all col-
lection proceedings, including civil contempt proceedings. Bank-
ruptcy filing also puts an end to creditor collection calls. One of 
the most commonly listed reasons for seeking bankruptcy relief 
is the desire to halt threatening creditor phone calls.104 One in 
four individuals contacted by debt collection agencies described 
feeling threatened.105 Additionally, when I interviewed low-in-
come undocumented debtors for a previous project, many re-
ported feeling burdened or harassed by creditor calls.106 It is of-
ten not feasible for debtors to simply ignore the calls. The calls 
take a tremendous psychological toll.107 Even if lenders would 
not actually take the action they threaten, “[f]ew [debtors] know 
the law well enough to understand that the threats are 
empty . . . .”108 A bankruptcy filing puts an immediate stop to 
creditor calls, relieving debtors from burdensome and harassing 
phone calls.109  
Bankruptcy also puts a stop to garnishment, repossession, 
eviction, and foreclosure actions. Although low-income debtors 
may not have many assets, this does not mean that creditors 
 
 100. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
 101. Id. (providing for a stay of all collection actions and a stay of continua-
tion of any judicial process). 
 102. Id.; In re Daniels, 316 B.R. 342, 347–48 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004). 
 103. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (enjoining collection of any discharged debts). 
 104. See, e.g., Mann & Porter, supra note 4, at 314–15. 
 105. ACLU, supra note 5, at 32 (citing CFPB, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH 
DEBT COLLECTION: FINDINGS FROM THE CFPB’S SURVEY OF CON-
SUMER VIEWS ON DEBT (2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/ 
201701_cfpb_Debt-Collection-Survey-Report.pdf) . 
 106. Ondersma, supra note 31, at 1830.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Saul Schwartz, Bankruptcy for the Poor?, 45 OS-
GOODE HALL L.J. 471, 477 (2007). 
 109. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
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cannot interfere with their property. Creditors may go after 
debtors’ wages via garnishment orders or seek to repossess debt-
ors’ goods.110 For example, if they own a car—even if they have 
no equity in the car and it is thus not an “asset”—and they fall 
behind on payments, a creditor may repossess it. Low-income in-
dividuals often do not have enough savings on hand to purchase 
large household items, such as mattresses, sofas, refrigerators, 
and stoves. As a result, low-income debtors may purchase these 
items on credit, or under a rent-to-own model, and these items 
may be repossessed if the debtor misses payments.111 When a 
debtor files for bankruptcy, creditors cannot repossess property 
without the court’s permission.112 While this does not guarantee 
that the debtor will be able to keep the property, it provides some 
breathing room for the debtor to negotiate with creditors or iden-
tify an alternative means of keeping that property or acquiring 
an equivalent. For example, debtors in chapter 7 can “redeem” 
property by paying only what the property is worth rather than 
the total owed. If friends or family give or lend the needed funds 
the debtor can keep the property.113  
Bankruptcy filing can also prevent evictions or foreclosures. 
Again, bankruptcy does not guarantee that debtors will be able 
to retain their home or apartment, but it temporarily halts such 
proceedings and gives debtors a chance to catch up on arrears.114 
In addition, many bankruptcy courts have loss mitigation pro-
grams that provide for mortgage renegotiation during the bank-
ruptcy process.115 These remedies will not work in all cases—for 
example, landlords with prepetition judgments are now permit-
ted to evict the debtor unless the debtor is able to cure the default 
 
 110. Ware, supra note 2, at 504. 
 111. Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need 
a Bed and a Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1250, 1254 (2000) (explaining that 
rent-to-own contracts are often used for furniture (38.9%), appliances (23.4%), 
or televisions (11.9%), and that “20% of rent-to-own customers are on public 
assistance”); Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit 
Card Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Al-
ternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 436–37 (2009). 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (providing that a stay can be lifted if a creditor is not 
adequately protected or there is no equity in the property and it is not necessary 
for the debtor’s effective reorganization). 
 113. Id. § 722. 
 114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 115. See General Order, In re Adoption of Loss Mitigation Program Proce-
dures, No. M-364 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/m364.pdf.  
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within thirty days of filing.116 However, for debtors that experi-
ence a temporary loss in income or increase in expenses and are 
able to resume payments, bankruptcy can spare individuals and 
family disruptions in housing.  
Finally, bankruptcy stops collection lawsuits.117 In addition, 
all procedures and processes related to the collection suit are 
barred. This means that an arrest warrant cannot be issued for 
failure to respond to requests for financial information or failure 
to appear in court, and the debtor cannot be arrested.118 The 
ACLU reported an instance where a man was able to avoid ar-
rest after missing a hearing on an unpaid mortgage deficiency 
only after filing for bankruptcy.119 Although criminal proceed-
ings (including some bad check proceedings) may be exempted 
from the automatic stay, this is not the case if the purpose of the 
proceeding is to compel payment of debt.120 
My empirical work with low-income undocumented debtors 
also supports the conclusion that bankruptcy could be beneficial 
for low-income debtors. Twenty-one (39.6%) debtors I spoke with 
expressed wanting calls from creditors to end, fifteen debtors 
(28.3%) indicated that they would not like to have to repay 
 
 116. Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the 
BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 441 (2009) (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(b)(22)). 
 117. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 118. Id.; In re Daniels, 316 B.R. 342, 345 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (concluding 
that creditor and counsel willfully and recklessly violated the automatic stay in 
pursuing arrest of debtor on contempt of court charge for failure to turn over 
financial information after debtor filed bankruptcy). The Bankruptcy Court 
stated, “[w]hen Debtor filed for bankruptcy relief, any further proceedings in 
the state court action were unconditionally stayed by operation of federal law. 
That would obviously include any efforts to enforce the state court’s arrest war-
rant.” Id. at 348. 
 119. ACLU, supra note 5, at 49. 
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)–(b); In re Daniels, 316 B.R. at 350. Unfortunately, 
the protection of the automatic stay does not guarantee that creditors will not 
attempt to violate the automatic stay. In one Minnesota case, a man was jailed 
for six days in solitary confinement on a warrant obtained by a debt collector, 
even though he had filed for bankruptcy. ACLU, supra note 5, at 20. He was 
denied access to a phone and thus could not contact his attorney. Id. Still, the 
penalties for willful violations of the automatic stay are very steep, so creditors 
should be deterred from such violations after being notified that the debtor has 
filed for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (stipulating that individuals injured 
by violations of the automatic stay are entitled to “recover actual damages, in-
cluding costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may re-
cover punitive damages”); In re Daniels, 316 B.R. at 357 (awarding debtor $135 
in lost wages, $2850 in attorneys’ fees, and $1350 in punitive damages). 
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money owed, ten (18.9%) indicated that they wanted to avoid re-
possession of personal property, and eleven (20.8%) indicated 
that they would like to stop a foreclosure or eviction.121  
2. The Fresh Start 
A key reason to seek the formal discharge of debts is to en-
sure that, going forward, one can retain the fruits of one’s labor 
without seeing them diverted to repaying creditors. Even debt-
ors with no valuable personal property may experience wage gar-
nishment that makes it impossible for them to pay all necessary 
expenses. One of the main benefits of bankruptcy filing is the 
immediate cessation of any wage garnishment.122 Debtors can 
also, in some circumstances, recover garnishments made within 
ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing.123 (As Nathalie Mar-
tin has pointed out, the garnishments are only recoverable if 
they are not “de minimus”—that is, if they exceeded $600,124 alt-
hough such amounts are hardly “de minimus” from the perspec-
tive of an impoverished debtor.) Low-income debtors may also 
struggle to build wealth if their wages are subject to garnish-
ment. Debtors with incomes at or near the poverty line may not 
be subject to garnishment.125 Some states may provide citizens 
with higher minimum wage standards than federal standards.126 
However, according to a study conducted by the National Con-
sumer Law Center, “no state provides adequate legal protections 
 
 121. Ondersma, supra note 31, at 1830. 
 122. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
 123. Id. § 547(b) (showing how payments within ninety days before filing 
may be recovered if they will enable the debtor to receive more than they would 
have received absent the payments in a liquidation). Although this provision is 
designed to bring the funds back into the estate to distribute amongst all cred-
itors, the debtor may be entitled to them if they have sufficient exemptions 
available. Id. § 522(g).  
 124. Id. § 547(c)(8); see Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the Bank-
ruptcy Code: Narratives from the Money Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 203, 
231–32 (2005). 
 125. Ware, supra note 2, at 503–04. 
 126. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 246, § 28 (2012); Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T 
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2019); 
Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/ 
minwage/america.htm (last updated Jan. 1, 2019). 
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to prevent garnishment and property seizures from driving fam-
ilies into poverty.”127 More than half of U.S. states permit gar-
nishment of one-fourth of debtors’ paychecks—and have “no 
limit on garnishment” if the check “is deposited in their bank 
account.”128 In addition, even in states that provide protections 
for individuals living below the poverty line, if a debtor’s income 
rises above the poverty line, garnishments will be reinstated.129 
Thus, although garnishment laws provide some protection for 
those individuals suffering the most financially, they do not help 
those living just above the poverty line. While these debtors may 
only have a small proportion of their wages garnished, any 
amount being garnished is likely detrimental when a debtor is 
already making so little. In addition, debtors protected from gar-
nishment because they earn too little may be deterred from earn-
ing more because they could then be subject to garnishment.  
After the debtor achieves a discharge in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, creditors are precluded from collecting on any debt in-
curred prior to the bankruptcy filing.130 Absent a formal dis-
charge of debts, the outstanding debts are always “waiting for 
the person should he or she ever find a way out of poverty and 
thus lose judgment-proof status.”131 
In states that permit arrest warrants to issue for failure to 
appear in post-judgment proceedings, a fresh start is particu-
larly crucial. Individuals may have no idea that a default judg-
ment has been entered against them, may have no idea that a 
warrant is outstanding, or may live in fear of being arrested. In 
one case in Perry County, Indiana, an individual was told they 
must pay $25 a month toward a $1865.93 judgment for an eight-
year-old unpaid rent debt; when the individual explained he 
could only afford $5 a month, he was told he would be arrested 
if he did not pay.132 In one 2015 case in the Southern District of 
 
 127. ACLU, supra note 5, at 23 (citing NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., NO 
FRESH START: HOW STATES LET DEBT COLLECTORS PUSH FAMILIES INTO POV-
ERTY (2013), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-no-fresh 
-start.pdf) . 
 128. Id. at 23 n.112 (citing Paul Kiel, Unseen Toll: Wages of Millions Seized 
to Pay Past Debts, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/unseen-toll-wages-of-millions-seized-to-pay-past-debts).  
 129. See Handling a Wage Garnishment or Third Party Citation, ILAO (Aug. 
2017), https://www.illinoislegalaid.org/legal-information/handling-wage 
-garnishment-or-third-party-citation. 
 130. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012) (enjoining collection of any discharged 
debts). 
 131. Ben-Ishai & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 477. 
 132. ACLU, supra note 5, at 17. 
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Texas, a man was arrested in his home for failure to appear in a 
case involving his nonpayment of student loans from 1983.133 
Although originally just $2500, the payments had swelled to 
$12,000.134 The individual lived on social security and disability 
and lacked sufficient disposable income to make payments to-
ward the debt.135 When he missed a court date—because he had 
just come out of open-heart surgery—several U.S. Marshals ap-
peared at his home and arrested him.136 In Nebraska, a woman 
living on exempt social security and disability income was jailed 
on a 15-year-old arrest warrant.137 The warrant stemmed from 
failure to appear on a case involving $1800 allegedly owed to a 
construction company for home repairs.138  
In addition to the financial benefit of discharge, a formal 
declaration of discharge can offer emotional or psychological ben-
efits as well; some have posited that the bankruptcy discharge 
“liberates the bankrupt psychologically.”139 Others have posited 
that debtors benefit from the process of appearing before a tri-
bunal to obtain an official, legal declaration that their debt is 
discharged because it helps them move forward.140  
Relief from even small amount of debts can have tremen-
dous impact on poor families. An Urban Institute study found 
that families with even modest savings—between $250 and 
$749—are more able to withstand income disruptions or sudden 
expenses than families with no savings.141 Their risk of eviction 
or missing utilities payments is substantially lower than fami-
lies with no savings.142 This suggests that where individuals are 
able to discharge small amounts of debt they can avoid getting 
 
 133. Id. at 5. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 52. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1061 (1987); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and 
the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 785–86 (1983). 
 140. See Pamela Foohey, A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural Jus-
tice in Consumer Bankruptcy 19–20 (Feb. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 141. SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., THRIVING RESIDENTS, 
THRIVING CITIES: FAMILY FINANCIAL SECURITY MATTERS FOR CITIES 3 (2016), 
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/thriving-residents-thriving-cities 
-family-financial-security-matters-cities. 
 142. Id. at 4. 
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caught in a debt spiral—instead of devoting ever increasing por-
tions of their income to servicing debt, these individuals can pay 
for cars, homes, food, and other economy-fueling goods and ser-
vices. In addition, they can meet their own basic needs, making 
it less likely that these individuals and families will need to rely 
on government aid to get by. 
Bankruptcy cannot offer a perfect “fresh start” in all cases—
if the individual constantly experiences income shortfalls, bank-
ruptcy cannot eliminate them. In addition, as Katherine Porter 
and Deborah Thorne have found, steady income is essential to 
debtor rehabilitation and many debtors who obtain bankruptcy 
relief still struggle to pay bills one year after filing.143 Still, in 
many cases the debt was incurred during a particular period of 
crisis: “The most common use of the discharged debt has been to 
provide income and medical care during times of personal eco-
nomic crises, such as job loss, illness, or divorce.”144 Particularly 
since the massive shrinking of the social safety net from 14.2 
million welfare recipients in 1994 to 2.7 million in 2016,145 indi-
viduals have been largely forced to turn to credit when income 
shortfalls hit.146 For these debtors, eliminating the debt before it 
spirals to consume ever-increasing portions of their income is 
critical. In particular, eliminating debts incurred in times of 
hardship could enable impoverished individuals to better meet 
their basic needs. Again, bankruptcy will certainly not help 
every low-income individual, and it is not a solution to poverty. 
However, particularly for individuals with debts incurred during 
a temporary crisis, debt relief may be essential.  
C. BARRIERS TO BANKRUPTCY FOR POOR DEBTORS 
While bankruptcy can indeed be beneficial for poor debtors, 
it is incredibly difficult for poor debtors to successfully access 
bankruptcy relief. It is now well documented that the poorest 
 
 143. Porter & Thorne, supra note 96, at 83–85 (reporting empirical evidence 
that one-quarter of debtors experienced difficulty paying routine bills one year 
after discharge). 
 144. Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bank-
ruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943–44 (2011). 
 145. Greene, supra note 21, at 236–37 (citing Caseload Data 1994 (AFDC 
Total), OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Dec. 19, 2004), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/ 
resource/caseload-data-afdc-1994-total; TANF Caseload Data 2016, OFF. FAM. 
ASSISTANCE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-caseload-data 
-2016). 
 146. Atkinson, supra note 12, at 18–19; Chrystin Ondersma, A Human 
Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, 90 TUL. L. REV. 373, 379 (2015). 
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debtors are the least likely to successfully access bankruptcy re-
lief.147 After the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code un-
der the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA), bankruptcy became even more complex and ex-
pensive, and thus more inaccessible for the poorest debtors.148 In 
addition, even if poor debtors are able to file, they are less likely 
to be able to afford attorneys, and, as discussed below, studies 
have shown that pro se cases are less likely to result in discharge 
of debt.149 
The total fees required to file for bankruptcy in 2018 were 
$335 to file under chapter 7 and $310 to file under chapter 13.150 
These were substantial increases from the time when BAPCPA 
was enacted in 2005, at which point filing fees were $200 for 
chapter 7 and $150 for chapter 13.151 The Bankruptcy Code per-
mits low-income individuals to apply for a waiver of the filing 
fee.152 To be eligible for a fee waiver, individuals must have in-
comes less than 150% of the poverty line and must be unable to 
pay the fee in installments.153 Many poor debtors file for fee 
waivers. According to a 2007 study, 71.2% of pro se filers (whose 
income is significantly lower than non-pro-se filers) filed for a fee 
 
 147. See Ben-Ishai & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 487–89 (demonstrating 
that merely waiving filing fees is insufficient to increase bankruptcy filings 
given high legal costs); Littwin, supra note 144, at 1937 (citing procedural com-
plexity as one cause of increased legal costs, resulting in poor debtors delaying 
or foregoing bankruptcy); Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 290 (“[M]ost families 
in serious financial distress do not file for bankruptcy.”); id. at 324 (“[D]ebtors 
may defer their filings for additional time because they must save up to pay 
higher attorney’s fees . . . .”). See generally MacArthur, supra note 116, at 440–
75 (detailing the struggle of poor debtors to access bankruptcy relief as a result 
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act). 
 148. See MacArthur, supra note 116, at 440–75. 
 149. See Ben-Ishai & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 487–89. 
 150. Schedule of Bankruptcy Fees, U.S. BANKR. CT. S. DISTRICT IND. (Sept. 
1, 2018), http://www.insb.uscourts.gov/webforms/newlaw/FeeSchedule.pdf. 
 151. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 439. 
 152. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 418, 119 Stat. 109 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1930(f ) (1)–(3) (2012)); see also U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM 103B: APPLICA-
TION TO HAVE THE CHAPTER 7 FILING FEE WAIVED (2015) [hereinafter OFFICIAL 
FORM 103B], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b103b.pdf. 
 153. § 418, 119 Stat. 109. 
  
2232 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2211 
 
waiver.154 The fee waiver forms, however, are relatively com-
plex.155 Debtors must calculate and report their monthly dispos-
able income and prove that they are unable to pay the sum in 
installments.156 This complexity may deter some debtors from 
even attempting it, but it is impossible to know how many debt-
ors do not file because they cannot afford the filing fee or because 
they are intimidated by the fee waiver form. 
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code added a 
number of procedural and technical hurdles to bankruptcy relief 
that made the process both more complex and more expensive. 
Debtors must obtain credit counseling before filing157 and file a 
credit counseling certificate with the petition,158 they must file 
documents showing all money obtained within sixty days before 
the filing,159 they must file their income tax returns,160 and they 
must complete and file a monthly net income statement.161 Debt-
ors seeking discharge under chapter 7 must complete the confus-
ing “Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test Cal-
culation” to prove that they are eligible for chapter 7 filing.162 
Failure to complete and file all of these items within forty-five 
days of filing the petition results in automatic dismissal of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy case.163 
When I teach consumer bankruptcy in my class, I ask the 
students to fill out a Chapter 7 Means Test Calculation Form for 
a relatively simple bankruptcy.164 In eight years of teaching, only 
two students have succeeded in filling out the form successfully. 
About half of the class makes an error at the beginning of the 
 
 154. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1965 (“Data from the 2007 [Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project] show that unrepresented debtors had significantly lower in-
comes [than represented debtors] at the time of bankruptcy.”); Philip Tedesco, 
In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 92 fig.4 (2010).  
 155. See OFFICIAL FORM 103B, supra note 152. 
 156. Id.; MacArthur, supra note 116, at 419. 
 157. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 425; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1). 
 158. 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1). 
 159. Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). 
 160. Id. § 521(e)(2)(A). 
 161. Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(v). 
 162. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 419; see U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM 
122A-1: CHAPTER 7 STATEMENT OF YOUR CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME (2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b122A-1.pdf; U.S. COURTS, OF-
FICIAL FORM 122A-2: CHAPTER 7 MEANS TEST CALCULATION (2016) [hereinafter 
OFFICIAL FORM 122A-2], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_ 
122a-2.pdf; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(v). 
 163. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2). 
 164. See OFFICIAL FORM 122A-2, supra note 162. 
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form because they select the wrong “number of people used in 
determining deductions [] from income” under Part 2, question 
5.165 The form states: “Fill in the number of people who could be 
claimed as exemptions on your federal income tax return, plus 
the number of any additional dependents whom you support. 
This number may be different from the number of people in your 
household.”166 Many students thought that only children are 
claimed as exemptions and did not include the debtor or debtor’s 
spouse. Next, virtually all students make mistakes when trying 
to ascertain the proper local or national standard in a given cat-
egory. They have trouble figuring out what should be included in 
a mortgage or rent operating expense versus a mortgage ex-
pense, and they have trouble understanding question 9, which 
instructs debtors to enter zero if the debt payment exceeds the 
local mortgage expense standard.167 The transportation expense 
section is even more difficult for them, as they struggle to under-
stand what is included in operating costs and what is included 
in ownership costs.168 These problems persist even though the 
students are aware of and access the tables provided on the De-
partment of Justice’s website. Without the link to those tables, 
the errors and confusion, already severe, would be magnified tre-
mendously. 
Although purportedly designed to keep out high-income 
debtors, the effect of the 2005 amendments has been to reduce 
access for the poorest debtors who cannot afford the increased 
fees and who have difficulty navigating the complex technical 
rules without attorneys.169 Ironically, the elements of the Code 
 
 165. Id. at 2. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 3. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revo-
lution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 228 (2007) (“If BAPCPA has 
an impact, it is by requiring more paperwork of consumer debtors, thereby driv-
ing up the cost of going bankrupt.”); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, 
Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 665, 668 (2005) (“[The means test] adds complexity and cost to all 
cases, and may deter or dismiss relatively few would-be chapter 7 debtors.”); 
Littwin, supra note 144, at 1936 (“At least one scholar has persuasively argued 
that a decline in overall accessibility was, in fact, the point [of BAPCPA].”); 
Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 395 (2007) (“As filing costs rise, even the most desper-
ately insolvent must delay bankruptcy, at least until they can save the amount 
necessary for the filing fee and the attorney’s fee.”); cf. Isabel V. Sawhill, Poverty 
in America, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 405, 407–08 (David 
R. Henderson ed., 2008). 
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that can benefit the few wealthy or high-income debtors that 
seek its relief are unaltered. Generous homestead exemptions in 
some states,170 exclusions of spendthrift trusts from the bank-
ruptcy estate,171 and the absence of caps on secured debt pay-
ments when calculating disposable income172 all work to ensure 
that the strategic high-income, wealthy debtor can indeed access 
bankruptcy relief.173 While burdensome for all debtors, poor 
debtors are less likely to be able to manage time away from work 
to complete all of the required paperwork and locate all of the 
documents (such as tax returns and pay stubs) that are required 
to be submitted.174 Additionally, the poor are less likely to have 
single, stable sources of income, which makes tracking down all 
required documents more complicated as they must locate in-
come records associated with each temporary or part time job.  
The counseling requirement is also problematic. First, most 
counseling services have a fee that averages about $50, which 
very poor debtors likely cannot afford.175 Second, poor debtors 
may not be able to afford time away from work to complete the 
counseling.176 Third, debtors attempting to navigate the system 
without an attorney—as poor debtors are more likely to be stuck 
doing—may simply be unaware of the counseling require-
ment.177 Even where debtors urgently need bankruptcy relief, 
courts are bound to dismiss cases where the debtors failed to ob-
tain a counseling certificate before filing.178 
In addition to making bankruptcy filing much more com-
plex, BAPCPA also caused attorney’s fees to increase.179 This 
 
 170. See Lawrence R. Ahern, III, Homestead and Other Exemptions Under 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: Observation on 
“Asset Protection” After 2005, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 585, 594 (2005). 
 171. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012). 
 172. See Culhane & White, supra note 169, at 676 (suggesting that unlimited 
secured debt may contribute to bankruptcy abuse). 
 173. See Carlson, supra note 169, at 227 (“[T]he 2005 means test encourages 
bankruptcy abuse [and is] more generous to high-income debtors than the old 
case law.”). 
 174. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 420 (“The poor may not have the time 
away from work to complete the required documents . . . .”). 
 175. Id. at 425 (citing Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy 
Reform: The Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 
1311 (2006)). 
 176. Id. at 420. 
 177. Id. at 430. 
 178. See In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005); MacArthur, 
supra note 116, at 429–30. 
 179. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1960 (referring to a study which found that 
chapter 7 attorney’s fees “increased by 51[%] between early 2005 and 2007”). 
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could be due partly to the increased complexity and partly to the 
additional liability imposed on debtors’ attorneys, including lia-
bility even for technical errors in the debtors’ schedules of assets 
and liabilities.180 Attorney’s fees increased 51% after the 2005 
amendments went into effect, from a mean of $712 in early 2005 
to a mean of $1078 in 2007.181 Before BAPCPA went into effect, 
fees ranged from $1500 to $3000 with a median of $2000.182 In 
February 2008, fees ranged from $1800 to $4000 with a median 
of $3000.183 
Some debtors living at or below the poverty line are able to 
obtain the counsel of pro bono or nonprofit bankruptcy attorneys 
who provide free or low-cost assistance, but the need for these 
services far outstrips demand. Between 2001 and 2007, the per-
centage of pro se debtors in chapter 7 rose by 250%, suggesting 
that debtors could not afford the higher attorney’s fees.184 At the 
same time, the percentage of pro se debtors that succeeded in 
obtaining a discharge significantly dropped, suggesting that the 
added complexity for bankruptcy filings after BAPCPA contrib-
uted to fewer successful filings.185 One study of pro se debtors in 
five districts found no dismissals of chapter 7 pro se cases in 
2001.186 In 2007, by contrast, 17.6% of pro se chapter 7 bankrupt-
cies failed.187 Almost all of these dismissals were due to technical 
deficiencies, such as incomplete tax records, errors in forms, or 
missed deadlines.188 These debtors were also much less likely 
than represented debtors to successfully correct these technical 
 
 180. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4) (2012); see also Catherine E. Vance & Corinne 
Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy 
Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283, 286–88 (2005) (describing BAPCPA’s “provisions 
directed at attorneys who represent consumer debtors in [c]hapter 7 cases”). 
 181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY RE-
FORM: DOLLAR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 22 (2008). 
 182. Id. at 25. 
 183. Id. at 25–26; see also Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee 
Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 30 (2012) (showing a fifty-
one percent increase in total direct access costs in chapter 7 no-access cases after 
BAPCPA and a thirty-seven percent increase in total access costs in chapter 7 
asset cases). 
 184. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1956, 1960 (analyzing data from five dis-
tricts and found a 2% pro se rate in the 2001 sample and 5.3% pro se rate in the 
2007 sample). 
 185. Id. at 1957. 
 186. Id. at 1971. 
 187. Id. at 1971–72.  
 188. Id. at 1976–77 (citing Consumer Bankruptcy Project data). 
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deficiencies and continue with their cases.189 As Angela Littwin 
explained, “pro se [c]hapter 7 debtors after BAPCPA encoun-
tered disentitlement through procedural hurdles twice: first in 
the form of unaffordable attorneys and, second, more directly 
through technical requirements they could not meet on their 
own.”190 Nathalie Martin explained, “Having read many pro se 
petitions, I am convinced that the vast majority of pro se debtors 
have no idea how to fill out the paperwork.”191 Martin further 
explains that many debtors list all of their assets and do not 
claim any exemptions, thus risking loss of important re-
sources.192 
Some debtors without the resources to pay for attorneys use 
petition preparers, who assist with preparation of the petition 
without providing legal advice.193 Petitioner preparers are not 
permitted to give legal advice; their role is limited to typing 
forms.194 The results for debtors using petition preparers are 
somewhat better than the results for debtors filling out the forms 
without any assistance.195 The fee for petition preparation 
should not exceed $200.196 However, debtors living at or below 
the poverty line are unlikely to have access to $200 for petition 
preparation.  
Another possible risk for low-income debtors is that they will 
end up filing a “no money down” bankruptcy, whereby they pay 
attorneys over time in a chapter 13.197 In a chapter 13, debtors 
repay creditors over a period of three to five years, and only re-
ceive a discharge at the end of the case.198 If they miss a payment 
 
 189. Id. at 1977. 
 190. Id. at 1957. 
 191. Martin, supra note 124, at 233 (emphasis omitted). 
 192. Id. at 233 n.105. 
 193. Michael D. Sousa, Legitimizing Bankruptcy Petition Preparers: A Soci-
olegal Prescription for Change, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269, 273–74 (2015). Sousa 
suggests that in simple, “no asset” cases, petition preparers should be allowed 
to give limited legal advice and accompany and aid debtors in their section 341 
meetings with creditors. Id. at 275–76, 311. 
 194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER GUIDELINES 
paras. 1, 10 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust-regions/ 
legacy/2014/03/10/bpp_guidelines.pdf. 
 195. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1965. 
 196. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 194, para. 4 (“The charge typically 
allowed in this district for a bankruptcy petition preparer’s services is no more 
than $200 . . . .”). 
 197. Pamela Foohey et al., “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1055, 1059 (2017). 
 198. Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter 
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and their case is dismissed, the debtor again owes all of this debt 
with interest and does not receive any relief. Unfortunately, 
most debtors do not have success in a chapter 13—only around a 
third of such debtors ultimately receive a discharge in bank-
ruptcy.199 By contrast, 95% of debtors in chapter 7 receive a dis-
charge.200 
Filing a chapter 13 may not represent a debtor’s choice of 
filing at all: studies show that certain districts have much higher 
rates of chapter 13 filings than others,201 and that Black debtors 
are more likely to end up in chapter 13.202 The cause of this dis-
parity has proven to be due to bias—attorneys disproportion-
ately steer Black debtors into chapter 13 cases—even when they 
express a preference for filing a chapter 7.203 As discussed above, 
filing a chapter 7 petition without an attorney can be risky, as 
17% of chapter 7 filings are dismissed.204 A debtor who feels un-
able to navigate chapter 7 pro se may select a “no money down” 
chapter 13 instead—not realizing that the risk of failure and 
non-relief is much greater.205  
All of the available evidence suggests that bankruptcy relief 
is out of reach for the vast majority of impoverished debtors. The 
increased complexity of the bankruptcy process after BAPCPA 
has only exacerbated this problem. Debtors living at or below the 
 
Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 394 (2012) (outlining the characteris-
tics of chapter 13 filings). 
 199. See Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of 
Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 107 (2011); accord Greene et al., 
supra note 97, at 1042 (finding that only 36.5% of a sample of 2007 chapter 13 
cases resulted in discharge). 
 200. See Porter, supra note 199, at 107. 
 201. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One 
Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 556–61 (1993) (finding the “local 
legal culture” has an impact on the number of chapter 13 filings); see also Chrys-
tin Ondersma, Are Debtors Rational Actors? An Experiment, 13 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 279, 308–12 (2009) (discussing evidence that demonstrates local legal 
players influence chapter 13 filing patterns). 
 202. See Braucher et al., supra note 198, at 393–95 (finding that African 
Americans disproportionately file chapter 13 bankruptcy partly because con-
sumer bankruptcy lawyers appear to be guiding them into this option). 
 203. Id. at 411–13. 
 204. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1971–72 (stating that, in 2007, 17.6% of un-
represented debtors had their chapter 7 filings dismissed or converted). 
 205. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing 
Black Americans, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/ 
bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-failing-black-americans-debt-chapter-13 
(“And once [black debtors] chose Chapter 13, we found, the odds of their cases 
ending in dismissal—with no relief from their debts—were about 50 percent 
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poverty line can seldom afford counsel, and, without counsel, are 
not able to navigate the complex filing requirements and fulfill 
all of the necessary prerequisites for obtaining a discharge in 
bankruptcy. These burdens are even more severe for Black debt-
ors, who are not only more likely to be living below the poverty 
line, but are also more likely to be pressured to file a chapter 13, 
under which they are unlikely to ever see their debt dis-
charged.206 Data suggest that around 13% of debtors in the bank-
ruptcy system have income at or below the federal census bureau 
poverty line.207 Given the barriers to filing discussed here, there 
are likely many more impoverished debtors who need bank-
ruptcy and who are unable to access bankruptcy.208 
II.  FAST-TRACK DEBT RELIEF OPTION: A PARTIAL 
SOLUTION   
Given that impoverished individuals experience substantial 
hardship when incurring even small amounts of debt, I propose 
a fast-track debt relief option for individuals with incomes at or 
below the poverty line who owe less than $5000 in debt. This 
Part offers two alternative proposals, which I will call Proposal 
A and Proposal B. I will first describe the proposals in detail and 
then will discuss the benefits of the proposals. These proposals 
are meant to compliment rather than supplant proposals that 
focus on providing access to financial aid to cover emergencies. 
Until we have a functioning safety net to help low-income indi-
viduals facing sudden expenses or sudden drops in income, we 
must have a way for them to easily discharge such debt before it 
consumes all available income and interferes with their ability 
to pay for necessities such as food and utilities.  
 
 206. See Foohey et al., supra note 197, at 1060 (“African Americans are more 
likely to file ‘no money down’ chapter 13 cases than other similarly situated 
debtors.”); see also supra notes 202 and 205 and accompanying text. 
 207. See E-mail from Robert M. Lawless, supra note 98. Of 2335 debtors in 
the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 14.9% of debtors had incomes below 
the census bureau poverty line based on their household size; of 2952 debtors in 
the current Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 12.36% of debtors in the study had 
incomes below the census bureau poverty line for their household size. Id. 
 208. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 410 n.18 (“Ninety percent of bankruptcy 
debtors have incomes below the national median, and a third of the bankruptcy 
debtors have incomes below the poverty level.” (quoting Ralph Brubaker & Ken-
neth N. Klee, Resolved: The 1978 Bankruptcy Code Has Been a Success, 12 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 273, 286 (2004))). 
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A. PROPOSAL A 
Any individual who has an income less than or equal to the 
poverty level income for his or her state should be able to easily 
obtain a discharge of $5000 or less in debt. This proposal is de-
signed to avoid the risk of a debt spiral and to achieve a greater 
likelihood that these individuals will continue to be able to meet 
their basic needs. Currently, the system is too complex and ex-
pensive, and such complexity and expense is particularly unjus-
tified in situations where small amounts of debt are owed by im-
poverished individuals. There is no meaningful recovery for 
creditors in such cases, yet the burden on these debtors is tre-
mendous.  
Under my proposal, an individual seeking discharge of 
$5000 in debt or less may, if their income is at or below the pov-
erty line, obtain a discharge of this debt under chapter 7 by filing 
a special one-page petition under penalty of perjury. The pri-
mary goal of this proposal is to make it at least as easy for im-
poverished debtors to file and obtain a discharge as it was for 
such filers prior to the implementation of BAPCPA. This should 
not be controversial since BAPCPA was purportedly designed to 
exclude only high income, “can pay” debtors from debt relief.209 
In addition, the amount to be relieved under this fast-track op-
tion is only $5000, so it does not represent a grave economic loss 
or risk for creditors.  
Rather than listing all assets, petitioners would sign an af-
fidavit that they have no non-exempt assets. Again, if the judge 
or trustee wishes to require further information they may do so, 
but it is a waste of time and resources in most cases, as the vast 
majority of such debtors have no non-exempt assets. (I will ad-
dress risks and moral hazard concerns in the next section.)  
Procedurally, creditors receive notice of the petition and will 
have thirty days to object to the granting of the petition. Because 
these are no-asset cases and the debt amounts are so small, § 341 
meetings will not be automatic but instead will take place only 
upon request by the creditor, judge, or trustee within thirty days 
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. If there is no request for 
a meeting within thirty days, the judge will grant a discharge. 
There will be no other requirements for these debtors: no coun-
seling requirement, no requirement that the debtor submit pay 
stubs and tax returns, no requirement that the debtor submit 
 
 209. See MacArthur, supra note 116, at 413–14. 
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statements of intention with respect to property, and no require-
ment that the debtor undergo any means testing. When only 
small amounts of debt are at issue, the barriers created by these 
requirements are simply disproportionate to any possible bene-
fit. These hurdles are justified, if at all, only for debtors with 
reasonable incomes who are seeking to discharge large amounts 
of debt. 
Rather than re-drafting each section and subsection to clar-
ify that these certain requirements to do not apply where the 
debtor’s income is at or below the poverty line and seeks dis-
charge of $5000 in debt or less, Congress can amend the Code to 
add an additional simple, concise subsection: 
Special Petition 
Individuals may file a special petition if: 
(a) The debtor’s current monthly income is at or below the poverty line 
for the state in which the debtor resides, 
(b) The debtor seeks to discharge not more than $5,000; and 
(c) The debtor has no non-exempt assets. 
If, after thirty days, no creditor has objected to the Special Peti-
tion, the Court shall grant a discharge of no more than $5,000 in 
debt. Debtors seeking relief pursuant to the Special Petition do 
not need to complete creditor counseling and do not need to sub-
mit any other documents or filings; §§ 109(h), 521(a)(1)(B), 
521(b), 521(e), and 521(i) shall not apply. The court or trustee 
may request a hearing to determine whether the debtor is eligi-
ble for the Special Petition. If the debtor is ineligible for the Spe-
cial Petition, the debtor may file a traditional chapter 7 petition 
without any prejudice and without any limitations to the auto-
matic stay. 
This special fast-track petition would be free. Because peti-
tioners are already attesting that their income is at or below the 
poverty line, no separate fee waiver form is necessary. The ap-
plication for fast-track bankruptcy will have included a state-
ment of current monthly income, an affidavit indicating that the 
debtor has no or nominal non-exempt assets, and an affidavit 
indicating that the debtor owes no more than $5000. The debtor 
can submit a list of creditors as in § 521(a)(1)(A), but the addi-
tional documentation required in § 521(a)(1)(B) will not be re-
quired. A schedule of assets and liabilities under 
§ 521(a)(1)(B)(ii), a statement of financial affairs under 
§ 521(a)(1)(B)(iii), copies of pay stubs under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), a 
statement of monthly net income under § 521(a)(1)(B)(v), and a 
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statement disclosing anticipated increase in income under 
§ 521(a)(1)(B)(vi) need not be filed. 
The debtor will also not be required to file the materials con-
templated in § 521(b). There will be no counseling requirement 
under § 109, and thus no need to file a certificate under § 521(b). 
The debtor will also not be required to submit tax returns under 
§ 521(e). Of course, § 521(i), which provides for automatic dis-
missal if this information is not submitted within forty-five days, 
also will not apply.  
It is important to note that trustees or bankruptcy judges 
would be able to request additional documents if there is some 
doubt or uncertainty about the debt or income threshold. In ad-
dition, debtors are still subject to a denial of discharge in the 
event that they provide inaccurate information; for example, if 
they knowingly misstated their income or debt level in applying. 
Section 727(a)(4) permits denial of discharge if “the debtor know-
ingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—(A) 
made a false oath or account; (B) presented or used a false 
claim . . . (D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to 
possession under this title, any recorded information . . . .”210 
The difference is that these materials would not need to be sub-
mitted as a matter of course.  
A schedule of assets and liabilities is not necessary in these 
cases, as only no-asset cases are eligible, and as creditors will be 
notified and must in any event file claims under § 501. If the 
debtor misstates the amount of debt on the bankruptcy petition, 
the debtor will not be entitled to fast-track bankruptcy. In no 
event would the debtor be able to discharge more than $5000 of 
debt using the fast-track process. Additionally, if the debtor owes 
more than $5000 they will not be able to access the fast-track 
system, even if they only want to discharge $5000 worth of their 
debt. Debtors with greater debt burdens should seek relief of all 
of their debt via the regular chapter 7 filing process; making the 
fast-track accessible to this high-debt debtors runs the risk of 
debtors being pressured (by creditors, attorneys, or trustees) into 
accepting less relief than that to which they are entitled.  
Assembling these materials is too onerous, complex, and 
time-consuming than is justified given the poverty of the debtors 
and the small amount of debt at issue in these fast-track cases. 
Because debtors receiving relief under the Special Petition are 
 
 210. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A)–(B), (D) (2012). 
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only discharging $5000, the eight-year bar under § 727(a)(8)211 
in place for traditional bankruptcies is arguably too onerous. I 
propose a four-year refilling bar for Special Petition cases. Low-
income debtors cannot be expected to get through eight years 
without a financial crisis that necessitates turning to credit—
indeed, even four years is arguably too long. Ideally this proposal 
would accompany other policy changes that would make reason-
able credit accessible to low-income debtors. For unsecured debt 
alone the median amount discharged is over $25,000, so even if 
a debtor files four special petitions over the course of sixteen 
years, this will represent less than the median debt discharged 
in a traditional chapter 7. Even if the debtor files for a traditional 
chapter 7 after four years, this additional $5000 discharged four 
years prior would not represent substantially greater losses for 
creditors relative to the amount discharged by the average 
debtor.212 Hence, permitting debtors to access the bankruptcy 
system again after four years as opposed to eight would not be 
costlier to creditors than a traditional bankruptcy filing. 
B. PROPOSAL B 
Because legislative change is cumbersome, fraught, and in-
finitesimally likely to succeed, another option, which may come 
close to achieving the same goal, is a rule change. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 521(a)(1)(B) does not require the filing of these items in all cir-
cumstances—it requires them “unless the court orders other-
wise.”213 Thus, there is nothing preventing the bankruptcy 
courts from ordering that these materials are not required in cer-
tain cases. Thus, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4002(b), 
Individual Debtor’s Duty to Provide Documentation,214 could be 
amended to provide that debtors with income below the poverty 
level are not required to file the materials indicated in 
§ 521(a)(1)(B). In such cases, courts would submit a form order 
waiving these requirements, similar to orders waiving the bank-
ruptcy-filing fee. 
For increased simplicity, the fee waiver and documentation 
waiver could be condensed. If a debtor provides sufficient docu-
mentation for a filing fee waiver, this would also suffice for a 
court order that documentation required by § 521(a)(1)(B) is not 
 
 211. Id. § 727(a)(8) (providing that debtors granted a discharge within the 
previous eight years are not eligible for a discharge). 
 212. Porter & Thorne, supra note 96, at 82. 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B). 
 214. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4002(b). 
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required. Under this approach, if a debtor files a successful fee 
waiver using Official Form B 3B,215 the court would file an order 
that the fee waiver request is granted and that the debtor need 
not file the documentation contemplated in § 521(a)(1)(B). Be-
cause the fee waiver form itself is somewhat cumbersome (and 
only debtors with incomes less than 150% of the poverty level are 
eligible for fee waiver),216 line two of the form could include a 
space where the debtor can enter the poverty level for the state 
in which the debtor resides.217 Because debtors may not know 
how to look up the poverty levels in their state, this line should 
include a link to the U.S. trustee website with a table providing 
the poverty levels in each state. If the amount entered in “your 
family’s average monthly net income” is equal to or less than the 
amount indicated in the following line, providing for the poverty 
level in the debtor’s state, the debtor would not have to complete 
the remainder of the form.218 A line would be added to the form 
indicating, “Debtor qualifies for a fee waiver and for a waiver of 
the § 521(a)(1)(B) documentation requirements.” The corre-
sponding court order would indicate that the fee waiver applica-
tion has been granted and that the debtor is not required to sub-
mit the documentation contemplated by § 521(a)(1)(B). Thus, 
because § 521(a)(1)(B) already provides that the documentation 
need not be filed if the court orders otherwise,219 the debtor can 
avoid these onerous filing requirements consistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code.  
There are two benefits to Proposal B. First and foremost, it 
does not require legislative action. Second, it would not require 
a limit of $5000 in debt—because the Code already provides that 
debtors need not file these documents if the court so orders,220 
there is no reason that a debt maximum need be imposed. This 
proposal does not relieve the debtor from all of the onerous re-
quirements, including 11 U.S.C. § 109,221 but it would make the 
process substantially more feasible for many debtors. 
 
 215. U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM B 3B: APPLICATION TO HAVE THE CHAP-
TER 7 FILING FEE WAIVED (2014) [hereinafter OFFICIAL FORM B 3B], https:// 
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/b_3b_0.pdf. 
 216. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f ) (1) (2012). 
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 218. Id. 
 219. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
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1. Justifying the Proposal 
This proposed fast-track petition can help low-income, no as-
set debtors to avoid debt traps and succeed in meeting their basic 
needs. Again, these proposals are not the only measures needed 
to address the problem of financing small financial shocks, or of 
facilitating bankruptcy filing. In addition to the proposals for 
limiting debt collection mentioned above, there are also pro-
posals designed to more directly help low-income debtors meet 
their needs. For example, Jacob Hacker proposes an insurance-
based plan to finance dramatic drops in income.222 His proposal, 
however, would only be triggered by 20% declines in income,223 
and would not solve the problem of smaller financial shocks, 
such as car repairs or less drastic medical emergencies. Abbye 
Atkinson, among others, has discussed the need for a more ro-
bust social safety net.224 Other proposals are at least partially 
credit-based. For example, Mehrsa Baradaran has proposed 
postal banking as an option for small loans to finance emergen-
cies with reasonable terms, which would help individuals to 
avoid debt spirals.225 Sara Greene proposes a Financial Services 
for Family Security organization modeled on the Money Advice 
and Budgeting Service, a program in Ireland that helps individ-
uals who are struggling with debt.226 Greene’s program would 
also provide small no-interest loans to cover emergencies, after 
meeting with a counselor to discuss the need for the loan.227  
There are also other important bankruptcy specific pro-
posals. Dalié Jiménez, Lois Lupica, and Jim Greiner have sug-
gested access to clear self-help materials that would enable debt-
ors to successfully file for themselves.228 Deborah Thorne, Robert 
Lawless, and Pamela Foohey, have suggested allowing debtors 
to pay attorneys’ fees in installments in chapter 7 cases so that 
debtors do not have to file under chapter 13 in order to pay for 
 
 222. JACOB S. HACKER, BROOKINGS INST., UNIVERSAL INSURANCE: ENHANC-
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 224. See Atkinson, supra note 12, at 76–81. 
 225. MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EX-
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 226. Greene, supra note 21, at 300. 
 227. Id. at 305. 
 228. See D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 
1123 (2017). 
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an attorney.229 Michael Sousa has proposed that petition prepar-
ers be allowed to give limited legal advice and accompany debt-
ors to § 341 meetings in simple, no asset cases.230 
Although Proposal A suffers from the need for legislative ac-
tion, Proposal B may be relatively easily achievable. Proposal B 
may be less controversial than other legislative proposals, given 
the relatively low amounts of debt at issue. Again, these pro-
posals are by no means sufficient to address the needs of the im-
poverished and over-indebted, but they may ameliorate the bur-
den for some—specifically, they can alleviate situations in which 
a poor individual’s debt burden is contributing substantially to 
her inability to meet basic needs.  
In addition to being potentially achievable, my proposal 
(whether ultimately achieved via Proposal A or Proposal B) pro-
vides an avenue to arrive somewhat closer to meeting the basic 
needs of impoverished debtors. Again, this proposal alone will 
not be sufficient to guarantee that the basic needs of debtors are 
met. It can, however, ameliorate the burden for some over-in-
debted individuals. 
This proposal should also be able to withstand creditors’ ob-
jections. Impoverished debtors will be getting no more relief than 
they are presently entitled; however, rather than being merely 
legally and theoretically available, the relief will actually be 
available to these debtors. There is no justification for the bur-
densome procedures currently in place when applied to the poor-
est debtors; and certainly not when relatively small amounts of 
debt are at issue. Pro se debtors currently face all but insur-
mountable obstacles to relief,231 and the poorest debtors are pre-
cisely those for whom these obstacles create the greatest injus-
tice.  
Because relatively small amounts of debts are being dis-
charged, creditors should be less concerned that a speedy process 
will be economically detrimental. These are no asset cases and 
these creditors would not be paid in a chapter 7 in any event; to 
the extent that they receive more payments under the existing 
system than a fast-track system, it is due to delays in filing from 
the expense and complexity of post-BAPCPA bankruptcy fil-
ings.232 Finally, even if the proposal does affect creditor recovery, 
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creditors are far more able to bear this cost than impoverished 
debtors.  
In addition to not causing severe losses to creditors, this pro-
posal also does not require the creation of any new agency or 
system. Existing judges, lawyers, courtrooms, and clerks will 
process these petitions in the same way that they currently pro-
cess chapter 7 petitions. The only difference will be that the pe-
titions can be processed much more quickly and with fewer pro-
cedures and hearings. If a judge or trustee has any concerns with 
a petition, a hearing can be held and the case can proceed pur-
suant to existing chapter 7 protocols if necessary. This simplified 
process will reduce the burden on bankruptcy courts233 and will 
make it possible for judges and trustees to devote time to more 
complicated cases. This could help maximize recovery for credi-
tors and help ensure cleaner fresh starts for debtors. In addition, 
this alleviates the costs and burdens on chapter 7 trustees; in no 
asset cases trustees still have to perform substantial work, but 
cannot be paid out of the estate. The fast-track proposal elimi-
nates the 341 meeting and the need for extensive review of 
debtor documents. Of course, attorneys, petition-preparers, trus-
tees, and judges would need to be trained and familiarized with 
the fast-track process. It is also necessary to address the risk 
that attorneys would charge their regular rate to assist with the 
fast-track process;234 this could be addressed by capping the 
amount that attorneys or petition preparers may charge to assist 
with the fast-track process.  
Because this process is so simple, non-profits and lawyers 
donating pro bono services will be able to help more individuals. 
Pro se qualifying debtors should be able to navigate this simpli-
fied filing successfully and should be able to obtain a discharge. 
The creators of the Financial Distress Research Project, Dalié 
Jiménez, Jim Greiner, and Lois Lupica, have spent the past 
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seven years studying what materials help individuals in finan-
cial distress.235 As part of this project, they created self-help ma-
terials aimed at these individuals.236 For example, UpSolve, a 
non-profit start-up launched this summer, plans to use these 
materials to help make bankruptcy “simple, fast, and free.”237 A 
special petition option would further facilitate access for eligible 
debtors. This organization and similar non-profits will serve a 
vital role by helping poor debtors with large debt loads access 
bankruptcy. 
Not only can this proposal help poor debtors seriously bur-
dening creditors or the court system, the proposal also has the 
potential to benefit the broader economy. If individuals must de-
vote all of their disposable income to servicing debt, they are not 
able to contribute to the economy by purchasing goods and ser-
vices. Current policies that keep debtors trapped in debt are not 
just costly to the debtor, who sacrifices a minimal standard of 
living,238 but are also costly to the economy overall. 
Finally, the proposal is a step toward satisfying human 
rights concerns. Because the United States has chosen not to im-
plement a robust safety net, impoverished individuals are at risk 
of inadequate housing, insufficient food and water, lack of 
healthcare, and an inability to secure a minimal standard of liv-
ing sufficient for human dignity.239 In addition, indebted individ-
uals’ human rights are at risk because they may be incarcerated 
as a result of being unable to pay a debt, or they may end up 
essentially laboring exclusively for the benefit of their credi-
tors.240 Atkinson is right that the access to credit alone is inca-
pable of meeting impoverished debtors’ needs; however, the lack 
of social safety net forces debtors to turn to credit, particularly 
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in emergency situations.241 So long as debtors are forced to rely 
on credit to meet basic needs, it is essential that they have an 
accessible path to effective debt relief.242 
III.  RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS   
This section responds to four potential objections: (1) the 
risk that some debtors with assets or with incomes above the 
poverty line will receive discharges, (2) the moral hazard risk; 
i.e., the risk that debtors will incur debt with the intention of 
discharging it, (3) the objection that such a proposal should be 
administrative rather than via the bankruptcy courts, and (4) 
the risk of adverse consequences to borrowers. 
A. THE RISK OF HIGH INCOME, HIGH ASSET DEBTORS 
ACCESSING THIS SYSTEM IS MINIMAL 
Allowing admission to this debt relief by affidavit, under 
penalty of perjury, and without submission of tax returns and 
pay stubs may allow some ineligible debtors to receive dis-
charges, but this risk is minimal. First, any judge or trustee can 
request additional proof of income for any case.243 Lying to the 
bankruptcy court is criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 157, so a 
debtor who is not forthcoming and is then audited risks criminal 
charges.244 Second, high-income debtors have little to gain from 
accessing this minimal discharge. High-income debtors can cope 
with $5000 in debt, and the benefit of the discharge of this rela-
tively small amount of debt would not outweigh the stigma asso-
ciated with filing or the hit to the debtor’s credit score. If their 
debt becomes unmanageable they can access bankruptcy 
through the regular bankruptcy system, which provides greater 
relief. For these debtors, the fees and complexities of bankruptcy 
do not pose an insurmountable barrier, as high-income debtors 
can hire attorneys who can help them access the full panoply of 
bankruptcy relief. The ability to obtain relief from serious in-
debtedness is an extremely valuable safety net, and it would 
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make little sense for debtors with reasonable incomes to seek re-
lief from relatively small amounts of debt and risk relinquishing 
this privilege. The current bankruptcy system benefits high-in-
come debtors in many ways—permitting unlimited deductions 
from the means test for secured debt such as home mortgages 
and cars, permitting unlimited homestead exemptions, and ex-
cepting spendthrift trusts from property of the estate.245 If the 
concern is high income or high asset debtors obtaining dis-
charges, the focus of reform should be on these matters—not 
maintaining complexity. Of course, as Ronald Mann has argued, 
the amendments thus far to the Code were not, in fact, designed 
to create barriers to wealthy, high-income debtors, but were in-
stead designed to keep low-income consumer debtors trapped in 
debt repayment as long as possible.246 But to the extent that an 
objection based on the risk of high-income, high-asset debtors ac-
cessing the system is a sincere one, limiting exemptions and al-
lowing creditors to access spendthrift trusts would have more 
impact than keeping the existing barriers to filing, which fall 
primarily on those unable to afford counsel. 
B. THERE IS LITTLE MORAL HAZARD RISK 
This proposal should not increase moral hazard, as it does 
not expand available bankruptcy relief. Again, the proposal is 
designed to make it at least as easy for the poor to access bank-
ruptcy as it was prior to BAPCPA—BAPCPA’s purported goal 
was to prevent high income, “strategic” debtors from filing,247 
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and my proposal only applies to debtors with incomes below the 
poverty line. It should not be controversial to remove these bar-
riers with respect to these impoverished debtors. As with any 
bankruptcy filing, discharge can be denied if there is truly fraud 
or abuse.248 Courts can also deny debtors access to bankruptcy 
filing “for cause.”249 Finally, once debtors file, they could not file 
again for eight years.250 Because this is not relief that is availa-
ble unlimitedly, debtors in poverty would likely reserve this op-
tion for true emergencies.  
C. AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION WOULD LIKELY BE 
INEFFECTIVE AND INEFFICIENT 
Some have proposed an administrative solution to filings for 
low-income, low-asset cases.251 However, experience with other 
administrative systems designed to provide relief to the poor 
suggests that an administrative solution is unlikely to be effi-
cient or easy to navigate.252 Systems for obtaining welfare bene-
fits, social security disability benefits, and veterans benefits are 
notoriously complex, and applicants are frequently denied relief 
due to technical deficiencies or other procedural barriers.253  
The United Kingdom offers a special process for debtors 
with little disposable income who owe less than 20,000 pounds, 
but the process is highly complicated.254 First, there are a num-
ber of eligibility restrictions in addition to the debt cap. Appli-
cants must have less than fifty pounds of disposable income per 
month, must not be homeowners, and must not own a car worth 
more than a thousand pounds.255 In addition, applicants must 
disclose any transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value 
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in the two years prior to filing.256 Debt relief under a Debt Relief 
Order is not immediate and not without costs and repercussions. 
Debts are not discharged until the Debt Relief Order has been in 
place for one year.257 Individuals seeking this debt relief must 
apply through a Debt Relief Officer and must pay 90 pounds to 
apply.258 Finally, individuals with Debt Relief Orders may not 
create, manage, or promote a company without the court’s per-
mission, may not manage a business without disclosing the debt 
relief order, and may not act as the director of a company.259 
These measures are likely to interfere with impoverished indi-
viduals’ full productivity. 
D. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT 
BORROWERS 
There are two related debtor-friendly objections to address. 
First, some may worry that the proposal will increase the cost of 
credit, or that creditors will limit credit for those below the pov-
erty line. Again, as this proposal is not expanding bankruptcy 
relief, there is no reason to think that the cost of credit will in-
crease. If anything, creditors may prefer that debtors access this 
system rather than risk discharge of greater debt amounts. 
BAPCPA did not cause a reduction in the cost of credit,260 so 
there is no reason to think that returning to something ap-
proaching the status quo for a subset of debtors would cause an 
increase in the cost of credit. Even if there is an increase to cost 
of credit, this may be a price worth paying for greater protection 
for the individuals and families facing the biggest burdens. Fi-
nally, any increase would likely be miniscule—for example, four 
states recently enacted restrictions on the conduct of debt collec-
tors, and a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study indi-
cated that while the cost of credit did increase, the increase was 
very small.261 
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Another potential objection is that debtors may receive a 
greater benefit from filing under a traditional chapter 7 that en-
ables discharge of greater amounts of debts. However, this pro-
posal does nothing at all to change or limit that relief; it would 
still be available. Debtors needing relief from debt in amounts 
that exceed $5000 would file pursuant to existing rules. Of 
course, as we have seen, the current system is too onerous for 
low-income debtors to successfully obtain relief, and we should 
not stop with this proposal. One potential risk is that this 
achievement would hinder broader relief. However, BAPCPA 
has been around for over a decade now, and although its negative 
consequences have been thoroughly documented there does not 
seem to be a chance at repeal. If this special petition is success-
ful, perhaps it can be expanded to also apply to impoverished 
debtors with greater debt loads who have no assets. In the mean-
time, the improved self-help materials discussed above may suc-
ceed in helping more low-income debtors achieve bankruptcy re-
lief.  
  CONCLUSION   
It is important not to overstate bankruptcy’s capacity to al-
leviate problems caused by chronic income shortfalls. Improve-
ments to the bankruptcy system can alleviate over-indebtedness, 
which can in turn alleviate some of the burdens on the impover-
ished, but direct efforts to reduce poverty are more critical.262 We 
must increase access to affordable housing, healthcare, food, ed-
ucation, and opportunities to improve income. We must also de-
velop a system for providing low-income individuals with access 
to genuinely affordable credit. If the only form of credit available 
to low-income debtors facing sudden expenses or income short-
falls is extremely expensive, it becomes impossible for them to 
dig out. In the meantime, however, there must be a simple and 
speedy way for low-income debtors to alleviate unmanageable 
debt burdens and avoid debt spirals. This proposal offers a sim-
ple and achievable tool that can aid in achieving that end. Alt-
hough it will not be a complete solution for every impoverished 
and over-indebted individual or family, it can make a huge dif-
ference for a family that, for example, is making ends meet—
even if barely—and is faced with a sudden expense: a medical 
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bill, home repair, funeral expense, or car repair. Absent access 
to decent and manageable credit terms, they will need to be able 
to get out from that debt load before it becomes destabilizing. 
 
